Lecture 4 - Military reform in Indonesia

Lecture: Military reform in Indonesia
Knut Asplund
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo

Article: Finalising the nation: The Indonesian military as the guarantor of national unity
John Roosa
Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol 48, No 1, April 2007

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Despite the technical difficulties, the lecture was the most enjoyable one of the four lectures thus far.

The lecture broadly covered three areas; the historical background from the end of World War Two to the present, the structure and socio-political position of the Indonesian armed forces, and military reform since the end of Suharto’s New Order.

Post-1945 history of Indonesia is marked by the central role of the military. Sukarno and Hatta, making use of the power vacuum following the Japanese defeat, declared Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945. It could be hypothesized that this declaration was premature and set Indonesia off on an unfortunate path, since it precluded a structured transfer of political power, as happened in neighbouring Malaysia. The Dutch reacted, to protect their citizens and economic interests, and military conflict became more or less inevitable. For example, the Battle of Surabaya, involving British forces, was wholly avoidable; Europeans could have been evacuated without bloodshed. Once blood had flown, military escalation was unavoidable. While the Republicans suffered military defeat, it was the start of the myth of the Indonesian military as heroes of the nation; a self-image that they were only too happy to promote. It is a self-image that Roosa claims still exists, even though the military’s actions to promote national unity have been counter-productive, and a self-image that puts the military at the heart of Indonesian life.

Since independence the Indonesian military have constantly been involved in action; anti-separatist wars and campaigns, Konfrontasi with Malaysia, and political crackdowns. Indonesia is not seen as having a central role in the Cold War, unlike say Vietnam or Korea, but Cold War tensions were certainly important. Sukarno’s ‘guided democracy’ Nasakom was an effort to balance the elements of nationalism (i.e. the military), religion (i.e. Islam) and communism, and western support for Suharto (e.g. provision of military hardware and military advice) was because he was seen as anti-Communist, unlike his predecessor. The scale of the violence and brutality following the coup of 30 September 1965 (500,000 estimated deaths) was something I had been unaware of. While the violence was directed at P.K.I members and sympathizers, it was also used to settle old scores. During Suharto’s regime Chinese Indonesians suffered badly: mass killings; forced resettlement to urban areas; anti-Chinese legislation such as the banning of Chinese-language newspapers, closing of Chinese-language schools, prohibition of Chinese religious expression, restrictions on permitted occupations; the forced adoption of Indonesian names; and harassment demanding bribes and pay-offs. The effects are still seen as a loss of cultural identity; younger generations of Chinese Indonesians do not speak the southern Chinese dialects, Hakka, Hokkien, Cantonese etc, of their grandparents.

The 1998 Jakarta Riots, which led to the fall of Suharto, were basically another anti-Chinese pogrom. It is worth speculating why the tactic of stoking hatred of a minority as a means of maintaining political power failed in 1998 when it had been so effective in the past; the wind of change had maybe reached Indonesia.

Notable features of the Indonesian military include its territorial structure and the way it was embedded throughout Indonesian society as part of the dwifungsi policy, with military personnel at all levels of civilian society from the village N.C.O. to the president. A hierarchical structure and lack of autonomous decision-making powers at lower levels (maybe reflecting military thinking in the past) is still a feature of Indonesian society. Local disputes, for example the electrical utility building a wall blocking access to a group of houses and a school, are approached such that the matter is first discussed by the men in the mosque, then the village committee is contacted, and the matter goes up the chain for a decision.

One issue that the lecture did not address is the ethnic make-up of the Indonesian army. To what extent are Indonesia’s various ethnic groups represented in T.N.I.? Or can the military be seen as simply a tool of Javanese domination?

The political changes brought on by reformasi promoted an identity crisis in the Indonesian military – they were forced to seek a new role and image. Military reform in Indonesia involves: demilitarization of the Indonesian political system (no automatic parliamentary seats and positions at the levers of power, reduction in support for the Golkar party, rules on involvement of military personnel and their spouses in the political process), separation of internal security (police) and external security (military), normalization of military finance (clear budgets, nationalization of military-run businesses), subordination of military personnel to the civilian justice system for non-military actions, and most importantly, acceptance of civilian supremacy and the human rights of all groups of Indonesian society.

Military reform cannot be considered as having been completed; on a practical level there still seem to be many problems. For example, civilian politicians still seem to be keen to involve military figures. Until the Indonesian military has a realistic centrally-funded budget they will be obliged to find money from elsewhere, be it through business or corruption. (And as the English saying goes: “He who pays the piper calls the tune.”) Low pay must also be addressed – if soldiers are poorly paid they have to find other sources of income. (I couldn’t find precise information about army pay scales.) Assessing T.N.I.’s position based on Maslow’s Hiearchy of Needs might provide some insight into what remains to be done.

Some progress in military reform seems to have been made, with Indonesia contributing to UNIFIL, making them feel part of the worldwide military community and where they, hopefully, can learn good habits and greater professionalism. Nevertheless, having a former general as president, Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono, albeit elected democratically, is rarely a good sign, although maybe it is the price that needs to be paid to make the army feel loved and inclined to stay in their barracks.

Lecture 3 - Climate change adaptation in Southeast Asia

Lecture: Climate change adaptation in Southeast Asia
Bernadette Resurreccion
Asian Institute of Technology

Article: Climate adaptation in Asia: Knowledge gaps and research issues in South East Asia
Bernadette Resurreccion, Edsel E. Sajor, Elizabeth Fajber

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The lecture was a report about research for the article, in effect a report about research about what to research. To the über-critical it might be considered as reflecting one of the major shortcomings of the world response to climate change; many meetings (e.g. Rio de Janeiro, Kyoto Bali, Copenhagen), much talk, but limited concrete action.

Key concepts presented in the lecture were adaptation and vulnerability. The former describes how communities react, or adapt, to climate changes, and the latter the degree to which communities are exposed to climate changes to which they are unable to, or find it difficult to, adapt.

The lecturer’s key thesis was that vulnerability should be the focus and starting point in climate change debate, and consequently it is a development issue rather than purely an environment issue. I would agree with this standpoint. However, the social, political and economic implications then become enormous – vulnerability is a result of being socially and economically disadvantaged, implying that the whole current economic and political system needs changing; hardly a position likely to endear people to the current political elite. The research ascertained ‘hotspots of vulnerability,’ which broadly matched economic and social development. On a national level, the SEA nations least vulnerable are the wealthiest on the UN Human Development Index. At a local level, it is the poorest who suffer most – a rich man can move to a house on a hill to avoid flooding, a rich woman can ensure that her home is constructed properly and able to withstand hurricane-force winds.

When considering the response to climate change, attention was drawn to the question of at what level planning for climate change should occur; local, meso, or national. It was claimed that the hierarchical, paternalistic, and patronage-based political systems of many SEA nations hindered concrete actions and local responses. The political system certainly affects climate change response in SEA – expensive technical fixes, e.g. dams and seawalls, allow opportunities for lucrative kickbacks, and make for good photo opportunities. NGO-based activities can easily be seen as a threat to political elites; someone else is taking charge. An aspect of NGO work not mentioned is that many NGOs in the field are western-based or western-inspired, consequently open to being criticized as neo-colonialism through the back door, or white-men telling brown-men what to do. If NGOs want to help they need to work through the current political system not in competition with it. In Malaysia and Indonesia the mutual aid concept of gotong royong could be used for concrete actions, allowing local political leaders to feel that climate change responses are a natural part of their culture and allowing them to be seen publicly as men/women of action and close to the people. To some extent this is already happening with clean-up actions in urban areas, or canal and river-cleaning programmes.

It was stated in the lecture that there was broad consensus on the likely effects of climate change, i.e. changing rainfall patterns, salt-water intrusion, storm surges, and stronger cyclones. Adaptation strategies to such changes can be divided into a number of areas; technical, societal-community, and individual. The technical strategies basically encompass infrastructural changes and increased knowledge. When considering infrastructural changes, one important question is who will pay. In view of the massive investment needed, some way of harnessing the profit-motive needs to be found. SEA governments cannot afford all the necessary infrastructural changes (reinforcing bridges, seawalls and flood barriers, moving vulnerable communities to different areas, building improved irrigation systems, developing effective sewage- and waste-management etc) and western development aid budgets are not even in the same league. Investment in research, i.e. increased knowledge, is one important area. In my opinion development of salt-tolerant rice strains should be a priority. In the area of societal-community adaptation strategies, knowledge dissemination and concrete, small-scale actions are key. At the individual adaptation strategies scale many strategies were noted, varying from late sowing of crops to temporary migration to urban areas, from diversification of livelihood sources to buying insurance. Poverty is a great incentive for creativity; Nobel-prize winner Muhammad Yunus’s insight leading to the micro-credit movement was that the poor do not lack the ability to adapt and develop, they merely lack the means.

In both the article and lecture there was one element that in my opinion was under-emphasized, namely that the majority of environmental problems are caused not by climate change but what may be termed environment abuse. This takes many forms: uncontrolled logging, illegal sand dredging, building on unstable slopes (often with terrible consequences like the Bukit Antarabangsa tragedy in December 2008), fly dumping of industrial waste, failure to meet pollution norms (a problem easily solved with duit kopi – ‘coffee money’), embezzlement of road and infrastructure monies (leading to substandard construction), uncontrolled urban expansion (leading to a greater risk of flash floods), mono-cropping (e.g. gigantic oil palm plantations), and many more. In the light of such localized, current and concrete problems, the risks of anthropogenic climate change take on a much lower priority.

Lecture 2 - Peace and war in Southeast Asia

Lecture: Peace and War in Southeast Asia: Trends and challenges
Timo Kivimäki
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies

Article: The Nature of Southeast Asian Security Challenges
Jürgen Rüland
University of Freiburg

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The article and the lecture complemented each other in that both presented a similar view of the security situation in SEA. The key points were:

• SEA has conflict patterns and reactions to conflict that are typical for the region.
• ASEAN has significantly reduced conflict, particularly inter-state conflict.
• Intra-state conflicts currently pose the greatest challenges.
• Changes in SEA society (e.g. democratization, more free and vociferous media) mean that SEA nations will have to adopt different approaches to handling conflict. Rüland wants greater recognition of the interdependency of conflicts, while Kivimäki proposes solutions based on customary law, national reconciliation and international assistance.

Kivimäki stressed the fact that ASEAN membership correlated with a significant drop in violence and conflict but from the lecture it was not clear to what extent this was a cause or an effect.

While the list of conflicts was long: Philippines – migrants and locals (Mindanao); Burma – state and ethnic groups, ethnic groups and sub-ethnic groups, state and democratic forces; Thailand – separatist groups in Southern Thailand, state and opposition (urban and rural, wealthy and poor); Indonesia – separatist (Papua, Aceh), migrants and locals (Kalimantan), the causes are broadly similar to those found throughout the world, as Rüland (p558) puts it:
“The conflicts are usually shaped by previous interactions, socio-economic disparities, experiences of political and cultural discrimination, and single traumatic incidents that are revitalized by the collective memory whenever inter-ethnic relations deteriorate.”

An interesting point was the distinction between conflict resolution and conflict management. The claim was made that SEA states conducted conflict management not conflict resolution, thus not bringing conflicts to a conclusion. The SEA approach can be found in most other conflicts, for example, the Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland has not finally and irrevocably resolved the status of the province; it manages the status and sets rules for actions. Likewise, my opinion is that the agreement in Aceh is not a final resolution to the Aceh conflict. Indeed, signs of stress are already being seen with the arguments over the implementation of Sharia law. (“Aceh passes adultery stoning law”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8254631.stm, accessed Sept 2009)

Conflict management becomes easier with economic development; it is no coincidence that the worst conflicts occur in the relatively poorer regions of a country – Aceh, Papua, Southern Thailand, Mindanao in SEA, Northern Ireland, the Basque region in Western Europe. Good conflict management allows economic development to occur such that antipathies gradually fade and both sides feel sufficiently strong to be able to make compromises, which can lead finally to resolution of the conflict.

A further interesting point from Kivimäki was that increased democratization and media freedom may make conflict handling more difficult than in the past when Asian media were under strict control, allowing “quiet diplomacy” through personal contacts. A recent example is the spat between Malaysia and Indonesia resulting in the “sweeping” of Malaysians, harking back to the time of Sukarno and the konfrontasi. (“Activists conduct sweep on Malaysians”, Jakarta Post, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/09/08/activists-conduct-sweep-against-malaysians-street.html) The trigger for this activism was a Discovery Channel programme mistakenly using the Balinese Pendet dance to promote Malaysia as a tourist destination. The real context is Malaysian-Indonesian rivalry and the use of this rivalry for political gain. Manufactured outrage regarding the mistreatment of Indonesian migrant workers, particularly maids, or the use of the traditional song Rasa Sayang in Malaysian Tourism advertisements are examples of “fiery nationalistic demagoguery reviving or keeping alive primordial stereotypes” (Rütland, p547) but the demagoguery coming via free media rather than tightly-controlled government media.

I enjoyed Kivimäki’s example of the riot at Papua University as it was a concrete example. I was struck by the fact that the story could have been found from all over the world; a street confrontation, poor policing leading to a situation where there is no clear way for the crowd to disperse, a consequent rise in pressure (as in a boiler), and an explosion as the most volatile elements boil over into violence. The policing here was military in nature, i.e. entrapment of the enemy, rather than civilian, i.e. encouraging dispersal. The example, in my opinion, demonstrates the need for better police training, including a change in the mindset of police officers. To some extent this is already happening in Indonesia with the formal separation of the police and military. It should be noted that poor policing of protest is not a monopoly of developing SEA nations, as seen by the use/abuse of ‘kettling’ and unnecessary aggression at the G20 demonstration in London in April 2009.

To conclude, I would like to comment on the issue of national sovereignty. The SEA nations are in their current form relatively young nations (e.g. independence dates; Indonesia – 1949, Malaysia -1957, Philippines – 1946, Cambodia – 1953, Vietnam – 1945) and not defined ethnically or geographically. Thus, each nation is a unitary nation because of will – because they want to. Hopefully they will be able to emulate the success of a European “Willensnation” – Switzerland.

Finally, since over half of the population of the SEA nations follow Islam, maybe the Muslim greeting should be taken more literally: Salaam alaikum – Peace be with you.

Issues in Southeast Asia - Introduction

Issues in Southeast Asia

While tidying up my computer I came across some material from a course I followed last autumn, Contemporary Issues in Southeast Asia.

The course was taught through the internet as a distance-learning course, and I took the course just for fun. I didn’t formally complete the course, I don’t need university credits, but I did do one of the exercises, a so-called learning diary.

I’m not quite sure what a learning diary is and what form it should take. The instructions stated that its aim is “to summarize, analyse and comment on the course and lectures.” I wrote my little essays and opinion pieces about the lectures and uploaded them to the course website, expecting that other students might read them and in return I could read others’ opinions on the topics. This turned out not to be how the course was organised and my work, simplistic and from a layman’s perspective, just seemed to disappear into cyberspace.

Since time has passed, I feel free to post my learning diary texts for people to enjoy or ignore as they see fit. They are posted as they were written and the thoughts are those of the moment when they were written; I might very well have changed my mind.

The topics:

Lecture 1 – Introduction (no learning diary)
Lecture 2 – Peace and war in Southeast Asia: Trends and challenges
Lecture 3 – Climate change adaptation in Southeast Asia
Lecture 4 – Military reform in Indonesia
Lecture 5 – Islam in Southeast Asia: Islam and the challenges of freedom of religion or belief
Lecture 6 – Tourism in Southeast Asia: Challenges and new directions
Lecture 7 – Heritage, nationalism and identity in Southeast Asia
Lecture 8 – The political situation in Thailand: Contested democracy, the democratisation process, and the roles of civil society organizations
Lecture 9 – Burma-Myanmar: Beyond paradoxes and parameters
Lecture 10 – ASEAN regional economic integration: Southeast Asia as a business environment
Lecture 11 – Interlinkages of water and development in Southeast Asia: The Mekong River case
Lecture 12 – Gender discourses on migration and trafficking in the Mekong Region
Concluding comments about the course

World Cup

With the football World Cup imminent, I was recently interviewed by the newspaper Suomenmaa, the organ of the Finnish Centre Party, on my thoughts about the English national team's chances.


To read the full article you'll have to get hold of the newspaper, but a trailer, complete with photo, can be found here. Since the article is in Finnish, it might not help many of you, but for a laugh you can use Google Translate to get a flavour of what was said. Click here and then use 'copy and paste' to paste the URL address of the Finnish article into the translation box. Use your imagination to guess what I said.


I was also asked who I'd have as my starting eleven - a question which caught me out somewhat. So to entertain the real football experts, here is my (spontaneous) answer:

Goalkeeper: David James
Defenders: Ashley Cole, Ledley King, John Terry, Leighton Baines
Midfielders: James Milner, Gareth Barry, Michael Carrick, Frank Lampard
Forwards: Wayne Rooney, Peter Crouch


As my starting line-up is a little short on pace, Aaron Lennon can come on after a while. And Rio Ferdinand gets to play in the first game of the tournament so the team can benefit from his experience. The sharp-eyed will note that there is no room for Steven Gerrard. He plays for Liverpool F.C. so he gets to sit on the bench and chew his fingernails.


Who is going to be the 'star' of the World Cup? It has to be Vuvuzela!

On the buses

Last weekend Henry went on a day trip to Helsinki with the church choir. He doesn't sing in the choir but his friend invited him along.

The bus left early and the trip included a visit to Kaisaniemi Botanical Garden followed by a guided tour of Suomenlinna fortress.

While the plants were of interest, particularly the tropical plants, the most important part of the trip was the bus.

Below, a few photos.

The bus.

The back of the bus.

The bus from the front.

The driver's cab.

Bus and running friend.

Spring 2

Finland has done its usual trick of moving from winter - boots, thick jackets, and gloves - to summer in the space of a week or so.

Everything blooms in one go, which is a problem for hay fever sufferers. (Birch and ash pollen generally causing the most problems.) The good news is that flowers blossom, bringing brighter colours into the natural world.

For your enjoyment, a couple of photos.

Daffodils

Tulips