Lecture 2 - Peace and war in Southeast Asia

Lecture: Peace and War in Southeast Asia: Trends and challenges
Timo Kivimäki
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies

Article: The Nature of Southeast Asian Security Challenges
Jürgen Rüland
University of Freiburg

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The article and the lecture complemented each other in that both presented a similar view of the security situation in SEA. The key points were:

• SEA has conflict patterns and reactions to conflict that are typical for the region.
• ASEAN has significantly reduced conflict, particularly inter-state conflict.
• Intra-state conflicts currently pose the greatest challenges.
• Changes in SEA society (e.g. democratization, more free and vociferous media) mean that SEA nations will have to adopt different approaches to handling conflict. Rüland wants greater recognition of the interdependency of conflicts, while Kivimäki proposes solutions based on customary law, national reconciliation and international assistance.

Kivimäki stressed the fact that ASEAN membership correlated with a significant drop in violence and conflict but from the lecture it was not clear to what extent this was a cause or an effect.

While the list of conflicts was long: Philippines – migrants and locals (Mindanao); Burma – state and ethnic groups, ethnic groups and sub-ethnic groups, state and democratic forces; Thailand – separatist groups in Southern Thailand, state and opposition (urban and rural, wealthy and poor); Indonesia – separatist (Papua, Aceh), migrants and locals (Kalimantan), the causes are broadly similar to those found throughout the world, as Rüland (p558) puts it:
“The conflicts are usually shaped by previous interactions, socio-economic disparities, experiences of political and cultural discrimination, and single traumatic incidents that are revitalized by the collective memory whenever inter-ethnic relations deteriorate.”

An interesting point was the distinction between conflict resolution and conflict management. The claim was made that SEA states conducted conflict management not conflict resolution, thus not bringing conflicts to a conclusion. The SEA approach can be found in most other conflicts, for example, the Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland has not finally and irrevocably resolved the status of the province; it manages the status and sets rules for actions. Likewise, my opinion is that the agreement in Aceh is not a final resolution to the Aceh conflict. Indeed, signs of stress are already being seen with the arguments over the implementation of Sharia law. (“Aceh passes adultery stoning law”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8254631.stm, accessed Sept 2009)

Conflict management becomes easier with economic development; it is no coincidence that the worst conflicts occur in the relatively poorer regions of a country – Aceh, Papua, Southern Thailand, Mindanao in SEA, Northern Ireland, the Basque region in Western Europe. Good conflict management allows economic development to occur such that antipathies gradually fade and both sides feel sufficiently strong to be able to make compromises, which can lead finally to resolution of the conflict.

A further interesting point from Kivimäki was that increased democratization and media freedom may make conflict handling more difficult than in the past when Asian media were under strict control, allowing “quiet diplomacy” through personal contacts. A recent example is the spat between Malaysia and Indonesia resulting in the “sweeping” of Malaysians, harking back to the time of Sukarno and the konfrontasi. (“Activists conduct sweep on Malaysians”, Jakarta Post, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/09/08/activists-conduct-sweep-against-malaysians-street.html) The trigger for this activism was a Discovery Channel programme mistakenly using the Balinese Pendet dance to promote Malaysia as a tourist destination. The real context is Malaysian-Indonesian rivalry and the use of this rivalry for political gain. Manufactured outrage regarding the mistreatment of Indonesian migrant workers, particularly maids, or the use of the traditional song Rasa Sayang in Malaysian Tourism advertisements are examples of “fiery nationalistic demagoguery reviving or keeping alive primordial stereotypes” (Rütland, p547) but the demagoguery coming via free media rather than tightly-controlled government media.

I enjoyed Kivimäki’s example of the riot at Papua University as it was a concrete example. I was struck by the fact that the story could have been found from all over the world; a street confrontation, poor policing leading to a situation where there is no clear way for the crowd to disperse, a consequent rise in pressure (as in a boiler), and an explosion as the most volatile elements boil over into violence. The policing here was military in nature, i.e. entrapment of the enemy, rather than civilian, i.e. encouraging dispersal. The example, in my opinion, demonstrates the need for better police training, including a change in the mindset of police officers. To some extent this is already happening in Indonesia with the formal separation of the police and military. It should be noted that poor policing of protest is not a monopoly of developing SEA nations, as seen by the use/abuse of ‘kettling’ and unnecessary aggression at the G20 demonstration in London in April 2009.

To conclude, I would like to comment on the issue of national sovereignty. The SEA nations are in their current form relatively young nations (e.g. independence dates; Indonesia – 1949, Malaysia -1957, Philippines – 1946, Cambodia – 1953, Vietnam – 1945) and not defined ethnically or geographically. Thus, each nation is a unitary nation because of will – because they want to. Hopefully they will be able to emulate the success of a European “Willensnation” – Switzerland.

Finally, since over half of the population of the SEA nations follow Islam, maybe the Muslim greeting should be taken more literally: Salaam alaikum – Peace be with you.