Knut Asplund
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo
Article: Finalising the nation: The Indonesian military as the guarantor of national unity
John Roosa
Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol 48, No 1, April 2007
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Despite the technical difficulties, the lecture was the most enjoyable one of the four lectures thus far.
The lecture broadly covered three areas; the historical background from the end of World War Two to the present, the structure and socio-political position of the Indonesian armed forces, and military reform since the end of Suharto’s New Order.
Post-1945 history of Indonesia is marked by the central role of the military. Sukarno and Hatta, making use of the power vacuum following the Japanese defeat, declared Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945. It could be hypothesized that this declaration was premature and set Indonesia off on an unfortunate path, since it precluded a structured transfer of political power, as happened in neighbouring Malaysia. The Dutch reacted, to protect their citizens and economic interests, and military conflict became more or less inevitable. For example, the Battle of Surabaya, involving British forces, was wholly avoidable; Europeans could have been evacuated without bloodshed. Once blood had flown, military escalation was unavoidable. While the Republicans suffered military defeat, it was the start of the myth of the Indonesian military as heroes of the nation; a self-image that they were only too happy to promote. It is a self-image that Roosa claims still exists, even though the military’s actions to promote national unity have been counter-productive, and a self-image that puts the military at the heart of Indonesian life.
Since independence the Indonesian military have constantly been involved in action; anti-separatist wars and campaigns, Konfrontasi with Malaysia, and political crackdowns. Indonesia is not seen as having a central role in the Cold War, unlike say Vietnam or Korea, but Cold War tensions were certainly important. Sukarno’s ‘guided democracy’ Nasakom was an effort to balance the elements of nationalism (i.e. the military), religion (i.e. Islam) and communism, and western support for Suharto (e.g. provision of military hardware and military advice) was because he was seen as anti-Communist, unlike his predecessor. The scale of the violence and brutality following the coup of 30 September 1965 (500,000 estimated deaths) was something I had been unaware of. While the violence was directed at P.K.I members and sympathizers, it was also used to settle old scores. During Suharto’s regime Chinese Indonesians suffered badly: mass killings; forced resettlement to urban areas; anti-Chinese legislation such as the banning of Chinese-language newspapers, closing of Chinese-language schools, prohibition of Chinese religious expression, restrictions on permitted occupations; the forced adoption of Indonesian names; and harassment demanding bribes and pay-offs. The effects are still seen as a loss of cultural identity; younger generations of Chinese Indonesians do not speak the southern Chinese dialects, Hakka, Hokkien, Cantonese etc, of their grandparents.
The 1998 Jakarta Riots, which led to the fall of Suharto, were basically another anti-Chinese pogrom. It is worth speculating why the tactic of stoking hatred of a minority as a means of maintaining political power failed in 1998 when it had been so effective in the past; the wind of change had maybe reached Indonesia.
Notable features of the Indonesian military include its territorial structure and the way it was embedded throughout Indonesian society as part of the dwifungsi policy, with military personnel at all levels of civilian society from the village N.C.O. to the president. A hierarchical structure and lack of autonomous decision-making powers at lower levels (maybe reflecting military thinking in the past) is still a feature of Indonesian society. Local disputes, for example the electrical utility building a wall blocking access to a group of houses and a school, are approached such that the matter is first discussed by the men in the mosque, then the village committee is contacted, and the matter goes up the chain for a decision.
One issue that the lecture did not address is the ethnic make-up of the Indonesian army. To what extent are Indonesia’s various ethnic groups represented in T.N.I.? Or can the military be seen as simply a tool of Javanese domination?
The political changes brought on by reformasi promoted an identity crisis in the Indonesian military – they were forced to seek a new role and image. Military reform in Indonesia involves: demilitarization of the Indonesian political system (no automatic parliamentary seats and positions at the levers of power, reduction in support for the Golkar party, rules on involvement of military personnel and their spouses in the political process), separation of internal security (police) and external security (military), normalization of military finance (clear budgets, nationalization of military-run businesses), subordination of military personnel to the civilian justice system for non-military actions, and most importantly, acceptance of civilian supremacy and the human rights of all groups of Indonesian society.
Military reform cannot be considered as having been completed; on a practical level there still seem to be many problems. For example, civilian politicians still seem to be keen to involve military figures. Until the Indonesian military has a realistic centrally-funded budget they will be obliged to find money from elsewhere, be it through business or corruption. (And as the English saying goes: “He who pays the piper calls the tune.”) Low pay must also be addressed – if soldiers are poorly paid they have to find other sources of income. (I couldn’t find precise information about army pay scales.) Assessing T.N.I.’s position based on Maslow’s Hiearchy of Needs might provide some insight into what remains to be done.
Some progress in military reform seems to have been made, with Indonesia contributing to UNIFIL, making them feel part of the worldwide military community and where they, hopefully, can learn good habits and greater professionalism. Nevertheless, having a former general as president, Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono, albeit elected democratically, is rarely a good sign, although maybe it is the price that needs to be paid to make the army feel loved and inclined to stay in their barracks.
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