Lecture 10 - ASEAN regional economic integration

Lecture: ASEAN regional economic integration: Southeast Asia as a business environment
Erja Kettunen-Matilainen
Helsinki School of Economics

Article: The regional economy: Looking forward by looking back
Malcolm Cook, In: Southeast Asian Affairs 2008, Singh D and Than T M M (Eds), Singapore, 2008

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The lecture presented an overview of regional integration via ASEAN and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), with some comments on foreign direct investment (FDI) and its role in the economies of SEA countries. The lecture was clearly structured and easy to follow. The main conclusions were:

1. Despite the diversity – culturally, historically and as regards trade and economic policies – regional economic cooperation and a considerable degree of integration has been achieved.
2. FDI has been a driver for growth, although since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 competition for FDI from China has remarkably increased.

The lecture avoided tricky issues such as whether FDI (in which control resides with the foreign company) and the major role of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is a form of neo-colonialism; or to what extent the inflows of FDI lead to concentrations of power and are detrimental to democracy. The question of working conditions, particularly of sub-contractors to MNEs, was also not discussed. Neither was the role of the Chinese communities in SEA business.

Implicit in the lecture was the idea that liberalization is always a good thing (for trade presumably based on Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage) yet the immediate negative social impact of the Asian Financial Crisis was less disastrous in Malaysia, which under Mahathir ignored IMF advice, than in Thailand and Indonesia, which followed IMF instructions for greater liberalization, privatization, and a reduction of government intervention in the economy. It seems that economic intervention might reduce economic efficiency yet be better for equality and society as a whole. Interestingly, US policy in the current global financial crisis, triggered by irresponsible lending leveraged by incomprehensible innovative financial instruments, echoes that of Mahathir in 1997 – support for ailing industries, support of financial institutions in difficulties (recapitalization with government money), running a massive public debt etc. Dr M., true to his combative style, has not been reticent in enjoying a bit of schadenfreude.

One side-effect of the travails of US-style economics is that economic policy norms are being questioned. An area that is of interest is Islamic finance, in which Malaysia is a world leader. Worldwide, the Islamic banking sector has grown considerably, for reasons unrelated to the current crisis, and its more vociferous proponents claim that the world economy would not be in such a mess if the financial system had followed Islamic banking principles. In view of the large number of Muslims in the world, Malaysia might be positioning itself to challenge Singapore for the position as leader in finance in SEA.

A noteworthy aspect of Islamic finance is, in my opinion, that economic and finance policy is being re-connected to moral and political values. In recent years it has been fashionable for finance and economics to be taught as ‘scientific’ and somehow amoral. Although South Asians and not Southeast Asians, Nobel Prize winners, Amartya Sen (Nobel Prize in Economics) and Muhammad Yunus (an economist who received the Nobel Prize in Peace) show how Asian approaches can help redirect economics.

Lecture 9 - Burma-Myanmar: Beyond paradoxes and parameters

Lecture: Burma-Myanmar: Beyond Paradoxes and Parameters
Ko Ko Thett
Co-ordinator, Asia Europe People’s Forum
Article: Expanding military, shrinking citizenry and the new constitution in Burma
Susanne Prager Nyein., Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol 39, No. 4, Nov 2009, pp 638-648

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Burma-Myanmar is a country I know very little about, having only followed western media debate about the advisability of economic sanctions and the selection of Aung San Suu Kyi as a Nobel prize winner, and recently having seen the film documentary Burma VJ. I remember also having enjoyed reading the historical novel The Glass Palace by Amitav Ghosh, which describes an Indian-Burmese family history.

The lecture presented recent Burmese-Myanmarese political history, factors influencing the current political situation, and possible outcomes.

The article re-stated the main ideas of the lecture, although the tone of the article’s conclusion was maybe more pessimistic than that of the lecturer; “the structural conditions of military rule and the civil-military relations makes the prospects for a real shift in the power relations in Burma look dismal” (p646). This conclusion can be considered relatively straightforward, since no military dictatorship willingly gives up power, and the debate around the Burmese New Constitution thus becomes of little relevance. A very nice observation in the article was the change in the description of the common populace from “working people” (lok tha pyi thu) during the time of Ne Win to “the class on the bottom” (a kye khan luh than; sa:) used by the current military regime (p644).

The beginning of the lecture presented horrendous human development statistics and an overview of Burma’s post-WW2 constitutional history. The lecturer then presented a series of parameters defining Burma’s political situation: the military (Tatmadaw), the people, geopolitical conditions, the political culture, and inter-ethnic conflict.

The key elements defining Burma-Myanmar’s fate are: Tatmadaw; the people including the Burmese political opposition; and the aspirations of the minority ethnic groups.

As with all military groups, Tatmadaw has its own mythology. It views itself as superior to civilians and the sole guardian of national unity. Its three main national causes are all nationalistic; non-disintegration of the nation, unification of the multi-ethnic nation, and preservation of national sovereignty. The ideas are very similar to those of the Indonesian military of Suharto’s era.

The people and the political opposition are in what the lecturer called “a double bind” – if they take part in political debate, following the rules of the regime, they legitimize the system; if they remain outside the system, they have little influence. The situation is common to all groups agitating for change in a non-democratic system, for example, during the Soviet era, or during various independence struggles (cf. Lai Kek and Chin Peng factions in the Malayan Communist Party during the late 1940s). A further factor affecting the Burmese-Myanmarese people’s attitude to politics are the scars of the brutality of the military - forced labour, poverty etc - and the scars of complicity - in a dictatorship everyone makes compromises (Note the large number of military, 500,000, relative to the size of the population). I briefly worked in Romania shortly after the fall of Ceausescu, and the legacy of mistrust and disillusion lingers long after the fall of a dictator.

The many minority ethnic groups of Burma have suffered greatly and there has been almost constant strife: the Karen uprisings, conflict with the Sha, discrimination against the Muslim Rohingya minority, expulsion of the Indian-Burmese, repression of the Anglo-Burmese community, etc. For positive change and development to occur, any democratic Burmese-Myanmarese government must be able to meet, even minimally, the aspirations of the minority ethnic groups for guarantees of cultural freedom.

To conclude, I would like to comment on the differing fates of Burma and Malaysia. They were both British colonies, they were both run by the British on relatively similar lines, they were both, for the standards of the time, relatively well-developed, they were (and are) both multi-ethnic, and they both gained independence as a consequence of Japanese occupation and British imperial fatigue. Yet, they have taken different paths: Burma a via dolorosa, and Malaysia, while not a path of sunny uplands, relatively steady political and economic progress. The reason is probably merely the chance of history. In Malaya, the Malayan Emergency of 1947 to 1959 was handled such that although British and Anzac soldiers fought against Malayan Communist Party insurgents (primarily ethnically Chinese) it was deemed an ‘emergency’ not a war, i.e. a police operation not a military operation. The Malayan army and police force were composed of Malays, but the Special Branch, who aided the British and Anzac military, were Chinese and able to provide excellent intelligence. The outcome was that when the country gained full independence the supremacy of civilian rule over the military had been cemented such that neither Malaysia nor Singapore, which was then part of Malaya, has political systems in which the military play a dominant role, unlike the other Southeast Asian nations.

Lecture 8 - Political situation in Thailand

Lecture: The political situation in Thailand: Contested democracy, the democratisation process, the roles of civil society organizations
Naruemon Thabchumpon
Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

Article: Thailand in 2008: Democracy and street politics
Ockey J., Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore) 2009 315-333

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The lecture had two main parts; a more theoretical description of the political situation in Thailand, and practical examples of case studies involving civil society organizations (CSO).

The first part included a discussion of substantive versus procedural democracy. Procedural democracy is in effect the delegation of power to an elite (cf. average income of MPs with national average income) with intermittent opportunities for the rulers to be selected by election. Substantive or participatory democracy is where democratic decision-making occurs at all levels and individuals can substantively affect outcomes. Problems associated with these interpretations are not unique to Southeast Asia, they can also be found elsewhere, the EU, for example, suffers a serious democratic deficit. In Finland the statutory co-operation agreement negotiations (YT-neuvotellut) are negotiations in name only. A further example is the new Finnish University law – I was invited to a meeting with Finnish MPs from south-western Finland to discuss the topic, which was done very politely, the only problem being that after the meeting, and off-the-record, one MP admitted that all substantive parts of the law had already been decided since it was a prestige project of one of the parties of the Finnish coalition. Substantive democracy is problematic for the ruling group as it implies the removal of hierarchical structures and a loss of power. On a lighter note, I can say that I have problems with notions of participatory democracy in my family; my children often do not understand that in certain matters Daddy decides!

In the lecture, the claim was made that the procedural democracy definition adopted in ASEAN countries means that the populace has limited rights. A very nice distinction was presented of “rule of law” versus “rule by law”, and likewise the presentation of various competing discourses of democracy in Thailand was very good. The discourse of “good governance” to overrule democratic principles is one that I personally dislike. It is commonly used and belittles people; rulers imply that the populace is too dim-witted to understand complicated issues. Interestingly, one of the world’s more successful states, Switzerland, defines the people as the sovereign and through the right to call a referendum if sufficient numbers wish allows direct influence on decision-making at all political levels.

The lecture dealt with the situation in Thailand at two levels; the national political level, and from the point of view of a study of civil society organizations. At a national level the struggle between the Red and Yellow groups seems to be a power play between two elites with little interest in issues interesting the majority of the population. Based on Ockey’s article, it seems that PAD’s actions are merely old-fashioned 'ends justify the means' thinking. The Sondhi quote in Ockey; “… same objective which are to protect the country [nation], religion and monarchy [king]” (p 326) shows the common approach of finding an enemy, real or imagined, against which exceptional actions are required. Ockey concludes that “Thailand will become very difficult to govern” (p 331). I would say that this is because the ruling elite wish to rule for the people rather than with the people.

The part of the lecture dealing with CSOs presented nine case studies. Most involved major infrastructural projects, which regularly have problems (cf. Botnia’s Fray Bentos mill in Uruguay (now to be transferred to UPM) and debate over energy projects such as nuclear power plants). The problem is essentially a question of benefits and externalities; who benefits and who bears the externalities.

One question raised in the lecture is how CSOs should safeguard the interests of the groups they represent – within or without the current political system, i.e. evolution or revolution. The debate has been around for a long time; compare the ideas of Antonio Gramsci.

Lecture 7 - Heritage, nationalism and identity in Southeast Asia

Lecture: Heritage, nationalism and identity in Southeast Asia
Michael Hitchcock
University of Chichester

Article: Asia fights to stem loss of cultural treasures, Thomas Kean, Myanmar Times, Dec 22, 2008. (http://www.globalheritagefund.org/news/conservation_news/asia_fights_to_stem_loss_of_cultural_treasures.asp, Accessed 15 Oct. 09)
‘Cannot find server’ message, read from Google Cache

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The lecture had two main strands; a discussion of the concept of ‘heritage,’ and the relationship between heritage and identity.

‘Heritage’ was presented as an originally western concept and differences in its interpretation in the Asian context commented on. The lecture stated that the Indonesian word for heritage, ‘warisan’ means ‘inheritance,’ which has different connotations than the English word ‘heritage.’ I did a quick search with Google Translate and came up with the following translations:

• Malay to English: heritage
• Indonesian to English: (nouns) 1. inheritance, 2. heritage, 3. legacy, 4. bequest, 5. heirdom, 6. patrimony, 7. settlement, (adjectives) 1. inheritable, 2. hereditary, 3. patrimonial.

The various translations throw some light on the difficulty of translating the word ‘heritage’. The etymology of the English word was given by Online Etymology Dictionary as:
‘c.1225, "that which may be inherited," from O.Fr. eritage, from heriter "inherit," from L.L. hereditare, ult. from L. heres (gen. heredis) "heir." ’

My own personal definition of ‘heritage’ would be ‘collective memory.’

The World Heritage Convention (http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext) divides heritage into cultural and natural heritage. Cultural heritage is sub-divided into monuments, groups of buildings, and sites. Natural heritage is sub-divided into natural features, geological and physiographical formations, and natural sites. In my opinion, this focus on the tangible overlooks the intangible elements of culture; skills, crafts, lifestyles etc.

The relationship between heritage and identity was central to the lecture. Historical perspectives are fundamental to the portrayal of heritage, and history is always seen through the prism of the present, hence, that which is chosen to be stressed reflects the elements that the prevailing ruling class want to be emphasized. The lecturer noted that the contribution of the Chinese community to Indonesian development is not shown in the heritage museum Taman Mini. An example from Malaysia is that recently the grave of the founder of the British colony of Penang, Francis Light, could not be found (http://thestar.com.my/metro/story.asp?file=/2009/10/6/north/4842890&sec=North). The corollary to what it is decided is to be forgotten is the decision of what is to be remembered.

The politicisation of history and heritage leads to some contradictions, for example, the traditional heritage of ‘wayang kulit’ (shadow play) has had to be changed. The ruling Islamic PAS party of Kelantan deemed that the Javanese and Hindi elements made the tradition un-Islamic and consequently banned this heritage. The stories (or should that be histories?) have had to be re-written (http://allmalaysia.info/msiaknow/arts/dance_wayang_kulit.asp?s=culture). A second Malaysian example are the archaeological findings from the Bujang valley in Kedah; they provide evidence of a Hindu-Indian civilisation that pre-dates anything that has been found for a Malay civilisation in peninsular Malaysia, which contradicts the prevailing myth of nationhood.

The coda of the lecture, in which the lecturer presented a couple of his current projects, gave a further instance of the politicisation of heritage. Jemaayah Islamiah by emphasizing Arab-Islamic heritage and downplaying the Malay-Indonesian heritage is in effect trying to re-write history to its own ends. To my mind, the basic problem is the claim of exclusivity of heritage – “my version of history and heritage is the only right one” – be it a nationalistic perspective, an ethnic perspective or a religious perspective. It should be remembered that the heritage and history of Southeast Asia are multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multi-national; Southeast Asia has multiple heritages.

Lecture 6 - Tourism in Southeast Asia

Lecture: Tourism in Southeast Asia: Challenges and New Directions
Michael Hitchcock
University of Chichester

Article: Understanding the ‘new tourist’ of Asia: Developing a global and local perspective
Norman Hassan, Perspectives in Asian Leisure and Tourism, Vol 1, Iss 1, 2008

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The lecture and article presented a brief overview of tourism in Southeast Asia with a focus on; the effects of tourism, in particular the economic, environmental and cultural effects; changes in the structure of Southeast Asian tourism, with the introduction of the concept of the ‘new tourist’; and the effects of various crises and catastrophes on Southeast Asian tourism.

The economic importance of tourism is well-documented, although in my opinion some of the claims made for its importance, nearly 20% of global GDP, seem a little exaggerated and probably reflect problems in definitions and measurement, for example accurate evaluation of the effect of various multipliers. The OECD has published guidelines to assist in standardization of tourism statistics, although I believe they may be more useful for comparative purposes than establishing absolute values. Nevertheless, tourism is undoubtedly an important economic area, as a source of FDI and foreign currency, as an employer, and as a business area with low barriers to entry, allowing small entrepreneurs, particularly women and minorities, to gain a foothold on the development ladder. One vexing issue is, however, the question of who benefits from the flows of tourism, i.e., to what extent do the tourists’ dollars trickle down.

The environmental effects of tourism cause some concern. Major historical attractions suffer damage from the shear volume of people visiting them, and the surrounding areas often undergo uncontrolled development as many people try to benefit from the visitors. Tourism in sensitive natural environments is also problematic; banning access is no answer and tourism management difficult. An example from personal experience is a family visit to Geopark Langkawi. We used a local tourist entrepreneur, traveled light, and did everything the enlightened eco-tourist should do, even insisting on collecting our own litter in a plastic bag. But on leaving the mangrove and entering open water the boatsman pushed the levers to full throttle, the plastic rubbish bag was caught by the breeze, flew overboard and was last seen floating in the sea. Despite our efforts, we had left a mark on the environment. Multiplied by hundreds of such accidents it is easy to see how natural areas get degraded by tourism. Further negative environmental effects of tourism can be found in the way beautiful areas get covered with concrete as one hotel or resort after another is built. The resorts also prevent access by local residents as previously public space is privatized.

The cultural effects of tourism are two-way; tourist to local, and local to tourist. Ideally tourism leads to greater understanding of others, less fear of the unknown, and greater tolerance. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. While young people in SEA are generally accepting of tourists, the older generations are often more critical, feeling that cultural norms are not being respected and new ‘bad’ ideas and behaviours imported. A further negative cultural effect is ‘disneyfication’ of local cultures. Local traditions become part of an international tourism industry and no longer reflect the culture from which they came. The show dancers at tourist events, for example in big hotels, each one in ‘traditional’ dress, have little in common with the reality of the various ethnic groups they purport to represent.

One topic of the lecture was changes in SEA tourism, with the concept of the ‘new tourist’. Here, the major change seems to be that western tourists - backpackers and package holiday tourists - are being joined by Asian and domestic tourists. This change is driving the increase in tourism in SEA. The two groups of tourists have slightly different consumption habits, which is a challenge. My feeling is that the habits of the two tourist groups will converge. Whereas hitherto Asian tourists have tended to buy package holidays, they are now following the path of western tourists with an increase in independent travel. This, in Asia as in Europe, has been aided by the establishment of low-cost airlines, e.g. Air Asia.

The final key aspect of the lecture was analysis of the effect on SEA tourism of various crises. From the data presented in the lecture I could ascertain no clear pattern of to what extent and over what time span, tourism is likely to be affected by health scares, government crises, terrorism, and natural catastrophes. My feeling is that tourists are to a large degree isolated from local events, so major societal changes can occur without affecting tourism. Perceptions of an acceptable level of risk play a role, with some nationalities more timid than others, and finally cost factors should not be overlooked.

To conclude, and hors d’oeuvre, my personal advice for SEA tourism development bosses:

1. Ensure a functioning and efficient transport infrastructure.
2. Ensure good personal security, i.e., low crime levels.
3. As the idiom goes; “Cleanliness is next to godliness.”
4. Do not kill the goose that laid the golden egg, i.e. do not destroy that which brought the tourists in the first place.
5. Ensure that the tourism industry can cater to all market segments; today’s impoverished backpacker is tomorrow’s wealthy middle-aged businessman.

Lecture 5 - Islam in Southeast Asia

Lecture: Islam in Southeast Asia: Islam and the Challenges of Freedom of Religion or Belief
Knut Asplund
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo

Article: Incense, silk and jihad; Islam in South-East Asia
The Economist, May 31, 2003

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Unfortunately, because of technical problems I was only able to hear the first half of the lecture, but based on that which I heard, and my knowledge of the subject, below a few comments.

Firstly, an observation that is slightly off-topic. Knut Asplund said: “Malaysia is a country where there is a huge population of immigrants, Chinese and Indians in particular.” In the Malaysian context great care must be taken with the use of the word ‘immigrant’ to describe the Chinese and Indian communities. Pendatang in Malaysian politics is used as a term of abuse and goes to the heart of Malaysia’s political dilemma; the intertwining of race, religion and identity.

The part of the lecture that I heard drew attention to the division in Indonesian Islam between various interpretations of the Muslim faith; modernist (more orthodox interpretations) and traditionalists (whose belief contains more folk beliefs). As the lecturer pointed out, the distinction is very blurred. In extremis a modernist might turn to a bomoh for help, or if he does not his mother-in-law might very well, and a traditionalist might be outwardly very devout in his actions. Or a traditionalist family might send their children to a modernist Islamic primary school simply because the teaching is better. And a girl might wear the tudung not for reasons of piety but, as I was told, because it was the fashion. I feel that Knut Asplund’s division between rural and urban Islam is a valid one, and the rural-urban divide can be seen in many other aspects of Indonesian life.

The Islam of Malaysia is stricter, partly as a result of changes in the 1970s and partly because it has been used for political ends for many years. In recent years UMNO has faced constant attacks, mainly from PAS, for not being sufficiently Muslim and has responded by favouring Muslims and promoting Muslim issues as a way of trying to tempt voters away from PAS. The Pakatan Rakyat coalition, an unlikely grouping of PAS, DAP and PKR, are in power in four states; Kedah, Kelantan, Penang, and Selangor (the situation in Perak is unclear pending judicial review). The dual system of civil courts and Syariah courts leads to tensions and in PR states the Islamic Affairs Departments (at state level) appear to be trying to gain greater powers, e.g. the banning of sales of beer in Muslim-majority (non clearly defined) areas. The Black Eyed Peas concert difficulties were also a result of decisions made at state level. Other controversies include the sentence to caning of the part-time model Kartika (offence: drinking beer) and problems with deceased people being claimed by the Islamic authorities for Muslim burial when their family feel the deceased person was of non-Muslim faith (e.g. Maniam Moorthy, the first Malaysian to climb Mt Everest).

Non-Muslims in Malaysia often feel under threat and claim they face discrimination in religious matters. Indian Malaysians, for example, contrast the police reaction to the Hindraf demonstrations with reactions to the cow’s head protest, in which a severed cow’s head (cows being sacred to Hindus) was dragged through the streets in protest at proposals to build a Hindu temple.

Islam, as interpreted by many, has difficulties being reconciled with human rights, such as the freedom to choose religion, or equality between men and women. The issue is often one of interpretation: ‘Unto you your religion, and unto me my religion,' [Qur'an, 109:6] or the idea that apostates should be stoned to death.

The image is presented that somehow Indonesian Islam is less restrictive but when a friend married a Sundanese she had to first convert to Islam, or otherwise she could not be married. Of course, Islam is not alone in such coercive behaviour; for my protestant brother to marry his Catholic wife he had to first promise to raise any children as Catholics. Somehow I feel that monotheist religions sit uneasily with the diverse, multi-identity SEA society; a polytheist belief such as Buddhism sidesteps the problem by saying that person A is a Christian Buddhist, person B an atheist Buddhist, and person C a Chinese Buddhist etc.

Lecture 4 - Military reform in Indonesia

Lecture: Military reform in Indonesia
Knut Asplund
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo

Article: Finalising the nation: The Indonesian military as the guarantor of national unity
John Roosa
Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol 48, No 1, April 2007

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Despite the technical difficulties, the lecture was the most enjoyable one of the four lectures thus far.

The lecture broadly covered three areas; the historical background from the end of World War Two to the present, the structure and socio-political position of the Indonesian armed forces, and military reform since the end of Suharto’s New Order.

Post-1945 history of Indonesia is marked by the central role of the military. Sukarno and Hatta, making use of the power vacuum following the Japanese defeat, declared Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945. It could be hypothesized that this declaration was premature and set Indonesia off on an unfortunate path, since it precluded a structured transfer of political power, as happened in neighbouring Malaysia. The Dutch reacted, to protect their citizens and economic interests, and military conflict became more or less inevitable. For example, the Battle of Surabaya, involving British forces, was wholly avoidable; Europeans could have been evacuated without bloodshed. Once blood had flown, military escalation was unavoidable. While the Republicans suffered military defeat, it was the start of the myth of the Indonesian military as heroes of the nation; a self-image that they were only too happy to promote. It is a self-image that Roosa claims still exists, even though the military’s actions to promote national unity have been counter-productive, and a self-image that puts the military at the heart of Indonesian life.

Since independence the Indonesian military have constantly been involved in action; anti-separatist wars and campaigns, Konfrontasi with Malaysia, and political crackdowns. Indonesia is not seen as having a central role in the Cold War, unlike say Vietnam or Korea, but Cold War tensions were certainly important. Sukarno’s ‘guided democracy’ Nasakom was an effort to balance the elements of nationalism (i.e. the military), religion (i.e. Islam) and communism, and western support for Suharto (e.g. provision of military hardware and military advice) was because he was seen as anti-Communist, unlike his predecessor. The scale of the violence and brutality following the coup of 30 September 1965 (500,000 estimated deaths) was something I had been unaware of. While the violence was directed at P.K.I members and sympathizers, it was also used to settle old scores. During Suharto’s regime Chinese Indonesians suffered badly: mass killings; forced resettlement to urban areas; anti-Chinese legislation such as the banning of Chinese-language newspapers, closing of Chinese-language schools, prohibition of Chinese religious expression, restrictions on permitted occupations; the forced adoption of Indonesian names; and harassment demanding bribes and pay-offs. The effects are still seen as a loss of cultural identity; younger generations of Chinese Indonesians do not speak the southern Chinese dialects, Hakka, Hokkien, Cantonese etc, of their grandparents.

The 1998 Jakarta Riots, which led to the fall of Suharto, were basically another anti-Chinese pogrom. It is worth speculating why the tactic of stoking hatred of a minority as a means of maintaining political power failed in 1998 when it had been so effective in the past; the wind of change had maybe reached Indonesia.

Notable features of the Indonesian military include its territorial structure and the way it was embedded throughout Indonesian society as part of the dwifungsi policy, with military personnel at all levels of civilian society from the village N.C.O. to the president. A hierarchical structure and lack of autonomous decision-making powers at lower levels (maybe reflecting military thinking in the past) is still a feature of Indonesian society. Local disputes, for example the electrical utility building a wall blocking access to a group of houses and a school, are approached such that the matter is first discussed by the men in the mosque, then the village committee is contacted, and the matter goes up the chain for a decision.

One issue that the lecture did not address is the ethnic make-up of the Indonesian army. To what extent are Indonesia’s various ethnic groups represented in T.N.I.? Or can the military be seen as simply a tool of Javanese domination?

The political changes brought on by reformasi promoted an identity crisis in the Indonesian military – they were forced to seek a new role and image. Military reform in Indonesia involves: demilitarization of the Indonesian political system (no automatic parliamentary seats and positions at the levers of power, reduction in support for the Golkar party, rules on involvement of military personnel and their spouses in the political process), separation of internal security (police) and external security (military), normalization of military finance (clear budgets, nationalization of military-run businesses), subordination of military personnel to the civilian justice system for non-military actions, and most importantly, acceptance of civilian supremacy and the human rights of all groups of Indonesian society.

Military reform cannot be considered as having been completed; on a practical level there still seem to be many problems. For example, civilian politicians still seem to be keen to involve military figures. Until the Indonesian military has a realistic centrally-funded budget they will be obliged to find money from elsewhere, be it through business or corruption. (And as the English saying goes: “He who pays the piper calls the tune.”) Low pay must also be addressed – if soldiers are poorly paid they have to find other sources of income. (I couldn’t find precise information about army pay scales.) Assessing T.N.I.’s position based on Maslow’s Hiearchy of Needs might provide some insight into what remains to be done.

Some progress in military reform seems to have been made, with Indonesia contributing to UNIFIL, making them feel part of the worldwide military community and where they, hopefully, can learn good habits and greater professionalism. Nevertheless, having a former general as president, Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono, albeit elected democratically, is rarely a good sign, although maybe it is the price that needs to be paid to make the army feel loved and inclined to stay in their barracks.